Contents

Introduction

World Congress in New York, October 2002

News from the Presidential Council

General Assembly Meeting, New York

News from the Working Parties

News from the National Chapters

Legal Developments

AIDA Website

How to contribute to AIDA Mail


7. Legal Developments

CZECH REPUBLIC - HARMONISATION OF LEGAL REGULATION OF INSURANCE AND INSURANCE INDUSTRY - THE FINALISATION OF THE CONTRACT ON ENTRY TO EU

1 INTRODUCTION

The Czech Republic is a candidate country with its entry into the EU planned for May 1, 2004. The country is therefore fulfilling intensively its obligations assumed during the entry negotiations.

At the present time, harmonisation of the legal regulation of insurance and the insurance industry is being finalised. The formal and legal liability of the harmony of the drafts of Laws with the EU-Directives is supervised by the state, and in particular by the Ministry of Finance of the Czech Republic. A certain extent of "control" of preservation of harmony of the draft laws with the directives of EU belongs to the Czech Association of Insurance Companies, the association representing the interests of the insurance companies. Our AIDA Section is an associated member and our members take an active part in the above work.

2 RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

By the end of the year 2002 the Government of the Czech republic negotiated the following "package" of drafts of legal rules from the areas of insurance (private-legal sphere) and insurance industry (public-legal sphere):

- The amendment of the Law No. 363/1999 Coll., on insurance industry
- New Law on insurance mediators as well as independent claims settlers
- New law on Insurance Contract
- Amendment of the Law No. 168/1999 Coll. on Insurance of Liability for damage caused by performance of motor vehicle
- Amendment of the Law No. 42/1994 Coll. on Additional Pension Insurance with State Contribution

3 VERIFICATION OF HARMONY

The objective is to achieve a real harmony between the EU-directives and the new legal norms, under the conditions of preservation of the Article 249 of the Contract on establishment of the European Community.

However, we meet situations, when - no matter if intentionally or by failure - there is a certain contradiction between the detailed regulation in the drafts of harmonisation norms and the directives.

We know that the basic condition for real verification of the harmony of the Law with the directive is, above everything, the valid text of the Directive of the European Parliament, with which the Draft of the Law is compared. Such a text is not always available in Czech. We have to face not only the problems of translation, but also the problems of interpretation and as such we try to contribute to constitution of obligatory terminology.

Concrete example: Law on mediators
The Law on Mediators is an example of the above stated problems. The shortcomings of the first draft of Law were of such an importance that the government of the Czech Republic decided to revise it. The problems were such as that of registration, competence of supervision, probity and credibility, categorisation of mediators etc., which were transformed very imprecisely.
Many drawbacks are repeated in the Draft of Law on Insurance industry.

4 OUR LEGISLATION IS MOVING INDEED

The "package" of stated laws should be negotiated by the Parliament of the Czech Republic in the April Session. The following legal norms of principal importance are included into the legislative plan of work of the Government of the Czech Republic:

June 2003:

- Draft of Law on the employees' additional pension insurance, which is to come into force on the day of entering into the EU
- Draft of the material intention of the Labour Code, which is to be in force from January 2005
- Draft of the Civil Law, which is to be in force from January 2005
- Draft of the Commercial Law, which is to be in force from January 2005
- Draft of the Criminal Law, which is to be in force from January 2005.

December 2003

- Draft of the Material Intention of the Law on Accident Insurance,

A Note of Thanks

We would like to thank, for the special help in connection with this work, professor Fontaine who we have consulted on particular questions.

DEVELOPMENTS SINCE THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE US TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT 2002 (TRIA) AND EFFECTS ON REINSURANCE

By Simon Cooper and Carmel Walsh, Barlow Lyde & Gilbert

Since the US Terrorism Risk Insurance Act ("TRIA") came into force on 26 November 2002, there has been uncertainty as to its application and interpretation. The speed with which the legislation was drafted and signed into law, and the immediate effect of TRIA has meant that these difficulties are being ironed out whilst compliance periods are running. The deadline for the first disclosure notices of terrorism cover which each qualifying insurer under TRIA must send out to policy holders, offering statutory terrorism coverage, is 24 February 2003. Failure to comply with this requirement prevents the insurer from participating in the compensation programme, though it is still required to provide TRIA coverage to the insured.

Without restating the precise provisions of TRIA, in very general terms, any insurer providing primary or excess insurance in a US State is required to offer coverage in its property and casualty insurance policies for losses from acts of terrorism in the US, on the same terms as those applying to losses from other risks. Any existing terrorism exclusions in relevant policies are nullified. The insurer may charge additional premium. If the insurer has complied with TRIA's requirements, particularly in relation to the disclosure notices, it is eligible for compensation under the federal terrorism insurance programme. This programme will provide a 90% quota share reinsurance cover for TRIA terrorism losses in excess of the insurer's deductibles. The deductibles are expressed as an increasing annual percentage of the insurer's directly earned premium from the prior year. The deductible is 1% of 2001 premiums for the balance of 2002, 7% of 2002 premiums for 2003, 10% of 2003 premiums for 2004 and 15% of 2004 premiums for 2005.
Aside from other defining factors, an act is only an act of terrorism under TRIA if, in the aggregate, it causes damage of $5million or more. Losses insured under TRIA are capped at an annual aggregate of $100 billion. Although participation is mandatory, an insurer can reinstate terrorism exclusions if the policy holder declines the additional cover offered to it, or fails to pay the additional premium set out in the notice within 30 days.

TRIA remains in force until 31 December 2004 and can be extended for a further year.

To assist in the introduction of TRIA, the US Department of Treasury has released a number of Notices which give interim guidance on TRIA and remain in effect until superceded by regulations or subsequent notice. The guidance Notices state that they can be relied on by insurers in complying with those provisions of TRIA to which each Notice relates. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) membership has adopted a model bulletin and disclosure notices. A number of Lloyd's Market Bulletins have also been issued on TRIA.

Even with such guidance, there is still disquiet arising from the effects of a hasty solution to a new and difficult insurance problem.

Disclosure - in order to comply with TRIA in relation to existing policies, insurers must notify each policy holder that terrorism coverage is offered. Lloyd's, the ISO and NAIC have drafted model disclosure notices for current policies, and for future renewals. It is important to note that coverage applies immediately from the date TRIA comes into force, and only if the policy holder fails to make payment of the additional premium within 30 days of receiving the disclosure notice (or agrees to the exclusion of terrorism cover) is any terrorism exclusion reinstated. Lloyd's has stated that any reinstated exclusion is retroactive and will, therefore, cover the 30 day offer period where terrorism cover is not taken up. In order to minimize the time that insurers are deemed on cover for terrorism risks, therefore, each insurer should act promptly to issue its disclosure notices.

Disclosure through broker/Leader - Although the US Treasury has stated that disclosures can be communicated through the channels, methods and forms normally used to communicate similar policy information, (broker or leader) ultimately each insurer will be responsible for such notification and the consequences of any failure to notify. Lloyd's has noted that Market Supervision will be monitoring this risk and managing agents' systems must record evidence of disclosure notification.

Additional premium - The insurer is entitled to charge additional premium for TRIA coverage. Although under TRIA premium rates remain subject to regulatory review which can determine a rate is excessive, inadequate or unfairly discriminatory, there is no initial guidance given to insurers of what will be deemed excessive or inadequate. Perhaps TRIA requirements that terrorism coverage is offered on terms that do not differ materially from the terms, amounts and other coverage limitations applicable to losses arising from events other than acts of terrorism, will be a guide to setting the additional premium. Nevertheless, as TRIA specifically identifies in its opening section, there is an absence of information on which estimates of the probability and cost of future attacks in the US can be made. There may be a corresponding lack of experience in rating such risks. New terrorism pricing models may be of limited assistance also.

Further, any insurer charging an elevated premium for TRIA terrorism cover may be subject to an unwanted knock on effect the following year. This is because TRIA premium is included in the total premium earned by the insurer, which is used to calculate the insurer's deductible for the following year under the compensation programme. Accordingly an elevated premium charged to the insured will produce a corresponding increase in the deductible the insurer faces on any insured loss the next year.

Aside from difficulties in setting rates, a problem has been identified in that the additional premium may cause some Lloyd's Syndicates to exceed their premium income limit. Lloyd's and the FSA are in discussions on this point but have not yet commented on its resolution.

One Insurer/Deductible - an early Lloyd's Market bulletin notes that although several syndicates subscribe to a risk the deductible is calculated and applied to each Syndicate individually.

In their aggregate, such deductibles will constitute a substantial exposure to US terrorism losses for the London market. It remains to be seen whether there is reinsurance available for these deductibles, either across the board or in respect of risks centred predominantly in the major US cities.

According to US Treasury guidance, a Parent company, its affiliates and subsidiaries, (where they meet the requirements of the TRIA definition of insurer), are deemed to be one insurer. In these circumstances, the deductible is calculated on the premium received by the entire group. It follows that a small insurer which is part of a larger group of companies which are all within the TRIA definition may be facing an enormous deductible which has been calculated across the group, resulting in serious exposure to terrorism losses.

Captives - When TRIA came into force, it was not certain whether Captive insurers were included. US Treasury guidance subsequently stated that Captives were included and that Regulations dealing specifically with Captives would be forthcoming. No such Regulations have yet been issued. It is understood that Captives are unhappy at being included in TRIA and have sought to lobby for Regulation which allows them to "opt in" to the arrangements.

Reinsurance - Reinsurers are excluded from the effect of TRIA, (and are not eligible for the compensation). However given the deductibles and the 10% of losses which insurers will have to carry under the government compensation programme, insurers are likely to require additional reinsurance. This is especially problematic for insurers and reinsurers of policies which were in existence and subject to TRIA when it came into force.

Reinsurers can rely upon, or continue to insert terrorism exclusions into their contracts. Should reinsurers wish to match the TRIA terrorism cover of underlying contracts, they will not be subject to the same restrictions, in setting high premium levels, with which insurers are faced. This may lead reinsurance of these risks to be too expensive for insurers and, even if the reinsurance markets have capacity to underwrite TRIA insurance, selective underwriting may follow so that high risk geographical areas are left without adequate reinsurance.

In considering whether existing reinsurances will respond to TRIA exposures on an underlying insurance, it will be necessary to analyse each reinsurance contract individually to determine whether it contains specific provision for a change in the law or nature of the underlying exposures, or whether general wordings (incorporation clauses, follow the settlements/fortunes) will be sufficiently wide to include TRIA coverage. This may be a particular issue for the many fronting arrangements which exist between the US and London markets.

The guidance that various agencies have provided goes some way to smoothing the introduction of TRIA. However, the fundamental operation of TRIA remains unchanged and may cause serious difficulty for insurers who find that they are required to offer cover for terrorism at potentially restricted rates, while the US government compensation for 90% loss only applies after each insurer's hefty deductibles for which no reinsurance or only expensive reinsurance cover is available. Any attempt to raise the premium to deal adequately with the risk, if not deemed excessive, will increase the following year's deductible.

While TRIA is an attempt to aid the US economy which was said to be hampered by the introduction of terrorism exclusions, such help is largely at the expense of the insurance industry. In an environment in which raising taxes is politically unpalatable, the US government has shied away from a scheme in which compensation is more generously centrally funded, and has forced the insurance industry into a position which is likely to place serious strain on its resources, and ultimately, its solvency.

DAMAGES AND PRACTICAL DIFFICULTIES RESULTING FROM THE WAY IN WHICH THE LAW REGULATES THE FORMATION OF A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE -
ADVISABILITY OF EXCLUDING THE POLICY

By Héctor Miguel SOTO, Argentina

THE FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE

  1. The mechanism for the formation of the contract of insurance, as it is stated in the Argentinean legislation, is complex.
    The mutual assent of the parties, is produced as if it were a contract made between two absent people.
    Therefore, unless the parties have expressed their contractual wish in a single act, and the assent takes place simultaneously, the rules that regulate the formation of assent in the contract of insurance are those that, included in the Civil Code, correspond to the making of contracts between absent people, with the modifications made by commercial law and insurance law.

  2. This mechanism of the formation of a contract of insurance becomes complex, or rather, becomes confusing, since, once the contract is finalised, the insurer is obliged by law to create a document called a policy.

  3. By applying the general legislation that regulates the formation of the contractual assent between absent people -applicable to the contract of insurance-, the proponent can revoke his proposal before the insurance company sends its acceptance or before it actually knows of it.
    In turn, the insurance company can annul its acceptance before the proponent (or his agent or representative) learns of it, even if the policy has already been issued.

UNCERTAINTY OF THE PARTIES DURING THE FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT

  1. The formation of assent in the contract of insurance has certain characteristics that generate uncertainty, not only for those who wish to be insured but also for the insurance companies.
    Next, we will mention the circumstances that cause this situation:

    a) With the insurance proposal made, the proponent does not know whether it will be accepted or rejected; in fact, he cannot even know whether the insurance company will consider it.
    During that period, of unknown duration, the proponent has to continue to offer his proposal if he wishes to be accepted, even without being certain that his offer will be accepted and without knowing if is worth waiting or not.
    b) The contract of insurance that has already been made can be annulled by the insurance company, revoking its acceptance, until the acceptance is notified to the proponent, or the policyholder (or his agent or representative) is aware of the insurer's express or implied acceptance.
    This precariousness in the contract of insurance causes insecurity but it is also favourable for situations that may take place in bad faith, especially on the supposition of an accident.
    c) Since the policy form is usually issued and delivered to the proponent after the formation of the contract of insurance , the proponent does not have the ability to prove, before that delivery, that a contract already exists betwen the parties.
    d) Likewise, when the insurance proposal is verbal, the insurance company lacks appropriate evidence to enable it to prove the existence of such proposal and, thus, to prove the existence of the contract itself, if the proposal is rejected by the policyholder.
    e) The law states that the contract of insurance exists by agreement and that the parties' "rights and responsibilities" begin with that agreement even before the policy is issued. This statement can create in the mind of the proponent, who is usually uninformed on legal matters, a false sense of security, since he may believe himself to be insured even before the policy has been issued, when maybe he is not because of the rejection of his proposal.
    As a result of the above position, there is a widespread but false belief amongst those seeking insurance that the sole, even verbal proposal 'to be insured', is enough.

  2. Thus, we see that the system created by the law of insurance, as regards the formation of contractual assent, is full of uncertainties and insecurities, which can be briefly summarised as follows:

    a) Undesirable doubts as regards the existence of the contract itself, its legal content and its conclusion.
    b) Precariousness of the contract of insurance already made, which can be annulled by the insurer before the proponent (or his agent or representative) knows about its acceptance.

DEFICIENT REGULATION OF THE "INSURANCE PROPOSAL" AND INSURER'S "ACCEPTANCE"

  1. The law of insurance states that the contract of insurance must be evidenced in writing. However, it allows the proposal form, the basis for the contract between the parties, to be formulated orally.

  2. The law of insurance emphasises the regulation of the content and formalities of the policy, but does not directly establish any provision regarding the proposal's content and form, the acceptance of the proposal and its notification.
    This is incongruous since it is in the proposal form, and not in its acceptance, that the contractual conditions are established.
    In every contract of consecutive formation, it is always the offer that contains the terms of the agreement, while the acceptance is just a simple manifestation of the agreement with the offered terms.
    The insurer's acceptance becomes, like the acceptance of any contractual offer, a simple, pure and uncomplicated manifestation of agreement with the proposal form.
    Given this, it is incongruous to insist on the policy including the terms of a contract that have been, or should have been, stated in the proposal.
    The demands of the law as regards the policy content, requirements and form, become incongruous with the mechanism for the formation of assent in the contract of insurance.
    The form and content requirements that the law lays down with respect to the writing of the policy, should, in fact, be applied to the proposal form, or in any case, to the document that serves as an instrument for the will of the parties, when the assent originated by the contract is of consecutive formation.

INCONVENIENCES GENERATED BY THE OBLIGATION TO ISSUE A POLICY OF INSURANCE.

  1. The Law requires the correct use and application of its own technical vocabulary.
    The practice, as well as legal analysis, are only possible if precise and correct concepts are used.
    The inappropriate use of concepts and the misconception of the true nature of certain documents make the management of the legal process confusing, if not erroneous.
    In the ambit of insurance we are able to detect, with alarming frequency and intensity, this situation of conceptual confusion which is largely due to the maintenance of the insurance policy as a document provided and accepted by law.

  2. The policy has turned, in practice, into a deceptive document that appears to prove everything, and that, without any basis, assumes the role of the source of the parties' obligations and rights of the contract of insurance. In fact, it should not be anything but the exact reproduction of that already set out by those parties.
    The unnecessary obligation to issue a policy after the making of the contract of insurance, has generated, in practice, a false appreciation of the legal nature of that document, and confusion as to which is the source of the parties' obligations and rights.
    Such terms as "cancellation of the policy" or "issuance of the policy" are generally used, although not very suitably, as equivalent to "rescission of the contract" or "making of the contract".
    The policy itself is wrongly pointed to as the source of the parties' obligations and rights instead of the contract made between them, which is a serious mistake and an unacceptable legal distortion.
    It is usual for many people related to the field of insurance to state that the insurers, instead of "making" contracts of insurance, "issue" policies.
    The insurance companies behave, in practice, as if the interested party in being insured "bought" a certain policy, which they call "product", from which the parties' obligations and rights emerge.
    This generates the false belief that the parties' rights and obligations originate from the policy, and not from the terms of the contract agreed prior to the issuance of the policy.
    The emphasis is on the content of a document, subsequent to the contract, and not in the content of the "proposal form" and of its " acceptance."

ADVISABLE MODIFICATIONS IN RELATION TO THE FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT OF INSURANCE

  1. We think that the proposal form should be drafted for the acceptance of the proposal and for the receipt of the confirmation of acceptance; this as a condition of the validity of such acts.
  2. We believe it is inconvenient to admit any other proof of the contract of insurance that is not the one emerging from the written form required in each case.
    The fact that a contractual "form" is solemn does not necessarily imply that is complicated, expensive or difficult to carry out or acquire.
    The idea of solemnity that refers to the "form" of the legal acts is usually associated with complicated ceremonials, witnesses and public officials' participation.

    The "form" that we solemnly use for the making of the contract of insurance is simple, without any special cost, and easy to produce and follow.

  3. It does not seem useful to tie the proponent to its "proposal form" if this is not written: if the proponent is interested in being insured, writing his proposal will not be any obstacle.
    The same thing can be said regarding the acceptance by the insurance company: if is interested in accepting the "proposal form", expressing acceptance in writing cannot be an obstacle.
    Those who can state their own contractual will precisely and clearly, or can ask the other party to state their own intentious precisely and clearly, and do not do so, are acting imprudently, if not in bad faith.

    There is no disadvantage, to demanding a written form, to reflect the contractual intentions of the parties. This grants certainty and legal security to its grantors and addressees.


  4. The prohibition of any other means of evidence other than the written form would not adversely affect the rights or interests of any person who pretends to enter into a contract of insurance adjusting to those conditions.
    As for the rest, if the proponent knows that the "proposal form" will only be valid when this one is in writing, and that the contract will only be perfected when the "acceptance" of the insurance company is produced and notified in writing, he will not make the mistake of thinking that he is insured by the single presentation of a "proposal form", which is in many cases, merely verbal.

  5. The speed of the insurance is not a convincing argument against adopting written forms.
    In the current system this speed is deceptive, since the insurance company is interested in considering the contract of insurance concluded if there is no loss, and in receiving the premium, but logically, there is not the same interest in covering a loss that took place before the policy was issued.
    On the other hand, if the intention of the insurance company is to provide an immediate coverage, a "temporary certificate of coverage" could be issued, which could have the nature of a unilateral legal act that is binding on the insurance company without the necessity of the insured's acceptance.

  6. The requirement of the written form in the cases already mentioned, as a condition of validity for them would undoubtedly have, the effect of correcting the defects in the contract that at present prevail as regards insurance.
    When the constituent acts of the assent that are not in a written form are deprived of all legal validity, the insurance companies themselves, the intermediaries and the interested parties buying an insurance would have no other alternative but to consider evidencing their intentions in writing.
    We believe that the proposed modifications would produce a radical change with respect to the transparency in the formation of the contract, with the consequent benefit of providing greater security to the parties. Evidently, many defects, errors and deceits would be eradicated.
    Nowadays, more often than is realised, people are "insured" by an insurance company they did not choose. Those "closing of portfolios", the massive transfers of insured people without their knowledge, and insurer manipulation are abhorrent practices that would not occur if the modifications that we propose were adopted.

  7. In brief, we can assert that the imposition of the written form, of a solemn kind, to the expression of the contractual will of the parties in the making of the contract of insurance, offers these advantages:

    a) It constitutes the most effective and simple means of proving the parties' will even in its slightest details.
    b) It prevents one from falling into confusing situations, imposing on the parties the duty of expressing themselves clearly in writing, if they intend to put one another under an obligation.
    c) It protects the proponents, making them truly understand what they are proposing, and who they are making a contract with

  8. The written form that we propose does not have any relationship with the formalism of those legislations that require the issuance and delivery of a policy in order to perfect a contract.
    Our proposal has nothing in common with these systems. Moreover, as we will see next, we consider that the policy should be
    excluded.

ADVISABILITY OF EXCLUDING THE POLICY AND DETERMINING THE DEMANDABLE MINIMUM CONTENT OF THE PROPOSAL FORM

  1. It is advisable to exclude the policy of insurance, at least in the way and with the functions established at present in the law of insurance.
    Such a document would become unnecessary and superfluous if the written form is imposed on the proposal form, to the acceptance on the past of the proposal, and to the notification of the acceptance on the part of the insurance company.
    As we have already seen, it is a document that, apart from being unnecessary and superfluous, is deceptive and usually generates confusion.
    The possibility that the proposal form be formulated verbally opens up the possibility for the insurance company to be the one, when issuing the policy, to unilaterally fix the terms of the insurance thereby disregarding the policyholder's will.

  2. In the same way that at present the law of insurance establishes the minimum content of the policy of insurance, so the law should establish the minimum content that the proposal form should contain in order to be considered valid as such.
    That would turn the proposal form into what it should really be: the real basis of the contract of insurance.